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Abstract 
 
As part of its 2020 Strategy adopted in 2010, the EU has set a number of headline 
targets including one for poverty reduction over the next decade. This is a major 
development  in  the  role  accorded  to  social  inclusion  in  the  EU,  and  thus  very 
important at the level of principle. However, the specific way the target itself has been 
framed, and the implications for approaches to implementing it, also merit careful 
consideration.  The  population  identified  in  framing  the  target  is  persons  in  the 
member  states  either  below  a  country-specific  relative  income  poverty  threshold, 
above  a  material  deprivation  threshold,  or  in  a  “jobless”  household.  This  paper 
presents an in-depth analysis and critique of the way that target is formulated on both 
conceptual  and  empirical  grounds  and  documents  the  consequence  for  our 
understanding of both cross-national and socio-economic patterning of poverty. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of alternative approaches to combining low income 
and  material  deprivation  to  identify  those  most  in  need  from  a  poverty  reduction 
perspective.    
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The EU 2020 Poverty Target 
1.  Introduction 
As part of its 2020 Strategy adopted in 2010, the EU has set a number of headline 
targets including one for poverty reduction over the next decade. This is a major 
development  in  the  role  accorded  to  social  inclusion  in  the  EU,  and  thus  very 
important at the level of principle. However, the specific way the target itself has been 
framed, and the implications for approaches to implementing it, also merit careful 
consideration.  The  population  identified  in  framing  the  target  is  persons  in  the 
member  states  either  below  a  country-specific  relative  income  poverty  threshold, 
above  a  material  deprivation  threshold,  or  in  a  “jobless”  household.  This  paper 
presents an in-depth analysis and critique of the way that target is formulated, and 
discusses alternative approaches to combining low income and material deprivation to 
identify those most in need from a poverty reduction perspective.          
 
2.  The EU’s 2020 Poverty Reduction Target 
At the European Council held in June 2010 the EU member states‟endorsed a new EU 
strategy for jobs and smart and sustainable and inclusive growth, known as the Europe 
2020  strategy.  The  Council  confirmed  five  headline  targets  to  constitute  shared 
objectives guiding the action of member states and the Union as regards promoting 
employment,  improving  the  conditions  for  innovation,  research  and  development, 
meeting the EU climate change and energy objectives, improving educational levels, 
and “promoting social inclusion in particular through the reduction of poverty”. This 
fifth headline target focuses on lifting at least 20 million people out of risk of poverty 
and social exclusion. Progress vis-à-vis this target for the Union as a whole will be 
monitored on the basis of a measure of the target population that incorporates three   4 
indicators (at-risk-of poverty; material deprivation; and jobless household), using data 
from EU-SILC, but Member States are free to set national targets on the basis of the 
most  appropriate  indicators,  taking  into  account  their  national  circumstances  and 
priorities. The population at risk of poverty and exclusion for the purpose of the EU 
target is defined on the basis of three indicators already included in the EU‟s social 
inclusion indicator set, but the precise way they are measured in the target differs in 
the case of material deprivation and low work intensity. More fundamentally, this is 
the first time these indicators have been combined to identify an overall target group 
“at risk of poverty and exclusion”.  
 
Looking at each element in turn, the at-risk-of-poverty indicator distinguishes persons 
living in households with less than 60% of the national median (equivalised) income – 
in other words, it is the most widely-used of the relative income poverty measures in 
the Laeken set (see Atkinson et al, 2002 on the social inclusion indicators adopted in 
Laeken in 2000, and European Commission, 2009 on the amended and enhanced set 
currently employed in the Social Inclusion Process). The second element, material 
deprivation,  is  captured  by  the  nine  items  included  in  the  common  material 
deprivation indicator adopted in 2009 (see Fusco et al 2010,  Guio, 2009). Importantly 
though, whereas the common indicator employs a threshold of 3, this element in the 
target counts only those reporting at least 4 out of 9 as deprived. The component  
relating to household joblessness is based on the pre-existing common indicator of 
“work intensity”, based on the number of months spent at work over the previous 12 
month period by household members aged 18 to 59 excluding students (see European 
Commission 2009). For the purpose of the target a threshold of 20% has been adopted 
to  distinguish  “low”  work  intensity,  in  other  words  those  in  households  where   5 
(relevant) members were in work for a fifth or less of the available time in aggregate 
in the year.  
 
The way these three indicators are combined to identify the target group is then that 
meeting any of the three criteria – being either below the 60% income threshold, at or 
above the material deprivation threshold of 4, or in a household with work intensity 
below the 20% threshold - suffices. In the EU as a whole, using EU-SILC data for 
2008,  this  identifies  24.5%  of  the  total  population,  or  120  million  people,  so  the 
agreed target is to lift at least 20 million of these people out of “the risk of poverty 
and exclusion”. In terms of the individual elements, 17% of the population are at-risk-
of-poverty  in  terms  of  the  60%  of  national  median  threshold,  8%  are  above  that 
material  deprivation  threshold  and  a  similar  figure  is  counted  by  this  low  work 
intensity measure, but since a significant proportion is captured by more than one of 
the three indicators (as we will examine in depth below) the aggregate EU figure is a 
good deal less than the sum of the three indicators.  
 
This  way of identifying the population  “at  risk” has  major implications,  and it is 
worth noting that when the idea of a poverty reduction target was first mooted in 
concrete form by the President of the European Commission earlier in 2010, the focus 
was on those “at risk of poverty” as captured simply by the relative income poverty 
measure.  This  has  been  the  most  prominent  among  the  Social  Inclusion  Process 
indicators since they were adopted in Laeken, and indeed had been previously used at 
EU level as a basis for the most widely-quoted headline numbers on poverty in the 
EU. With 80 million people in the European Union “at risk of poverty” on this basis 
in  2008, the initial  proposal was  for a  target  of reducing this  by one-fifth, or 20   6 
million persons. However, various member states were not satisfied with that initial 
proposal,  and  the  formulation  eventually  agreed  is  significantly  different.  Most 
obviously, the size of the target group is 50% greater but the reduction in numbers to 
be aimed for is still 20 million, so the target is much less ambitious in that sense – 
involving a reduction of one-sixth rather than one-quarter in the number at risk of 
poverty  and  exclusion.  In  addition,  though,  expanding  the  indicators  beyond  the 
relative income poverty to include material deprivation and household joblessness has 
a significant impact on which persons and types of person are to be included in the 
target group. Countries are free to make use of national indicators and to take national 
priorities into account in designing their own targets and policies, but have to be in a 
position to demonstrate how these will contribute to the achievement of the overall 
EU-wide target. The way the target population is identified thus potentially has major 
implications for the policies and strategies implemented at national and EU level, and 
merits serious consideration.  
3. The Implications of the Multidimensional Approach Adopted  
Combining these three distinct indicators represents a multidimensional approach to 
identifying  the  target  population,  and  the  move  away  from  reliance  on  a  single 
indicator such as low income for this purpose is potentially an important step forward.  
However, as Nolan and Whelan (2007, 2010) have argued the value of any particular 
movement from a unidimensional to a multidimensional approach has to be argued 
rather  than  assumed  and  in  the  case  of  the  EU  approach  the  expansion  of  the 
indicators employed has major implications which need to be fully thought through. 
We  now  proceed  to  explore  these  implications  in  some  detail,  and  provide  an 
assessment  on  both  conceptual  and  empirical  grounds,  of  the  advantages  and 
limitations of identifying the target population in this way. The elements requiring   7 
consideration in this context are the choice of indicators, the way each is framed, and 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  then  combined  to  produce  a  single  poverty  (risk) 
measure. It is worth noting in that regard that no explicit rationale has been advanced 
at EU level for either the indicators employed or the way they have been adapted and 
combined. On specific details, the use of a threshold of 4 rather than 3 on the material 
deprivation  element  and  the  selection  of  a  20%  threshold  on  the  work  intensity 
element seem to have been designed to produce a total that was acceptable from a 
political  perspective.  More  broadly,  arguments  for  combining  a  country-specific 
relative income measure with a deprivation standard that is common across countries, 
for combining these with an indicator of household joblessness, and for counting in 
the target group anyone who meets just one of the criteria rather than two or all three, 
have to be inferred rather than drawn from official EU documents or statements. 
 
 A recent consideration by Whelan and Maître (2010a) of the implications of choosing 
to focus on national or EU thresholds suggest that the combination of national income 
poverty line with an EU common deprivation threshold could be seen as a way of 
capturing the dual elements highlighted in the EU discussion of poverty measurement 
(European Commission, 2004). In terms of Townsend‟s 1979 classic definition, the 
approach can be seen as seeking to capture “exclusion from customary EU living 
patterns due to lack of resources at the national level”. The income threshold can be 
seen  as  fulfilling  the  resource  criterion  while  the  deprivation  stipulation  seeks  to 
capture the extent to which individuals in the EU are excluded from haring in the 
benefits of high average prosperity.
1 
                                                 
1 However, as Whelan and Maître (2010a) note the complexities of the issues raised by the 
measurement of poverty and social exclusion in the enlarged EU are such no one definition of poverty 
is likely to equip us to grapple with them.   8 
 
 
 In  assessing  how well the EU poverty target  proposals  enable us  to  achieve this 
objective  it  is  worth  emphasising  that  not  only  would  we  expect  a  satisfactory 
measure of poverty to identify a group in each society experiencing exclusion from 
customary living standards due to lack of resources but, in addition, we might also 
expect that poverty levels should vary across countries in a manner consistent with 
our knowledge of standards of living  in such countries. Taking into account both 
patterns  of  cross-national  and  socio-economic  differentiation,  a  poverty  measure 
should then vary across such units and categories in a manner consistent with one‟s 
theoretical understanding of the underlying concept of poverty.  
 
We now proceed to investigate such variation with respect to the target population 
underlying the EU target and its component parts, using data from EU-SILC 2008 
which have  been taken  as  the point of reference in  setting the target.
2 (France is 
excluded for the analysis because data  was not included in the EU -SILC dataset to 
which researchers have been given  access). We start in Table 1  by presenting the 
percentage in each country „at-risk-of-poverty‟ in the sense of being below the 60% of 
median  relative  income  threshold.  This  gives  a  picture  familiar  from  the  many 
academic studies and EU documents adopting this approach: the highest rates (of 20-
25%)  are  seen  in  some  of  the  New  Member  States  including  Latvia,  Romania, 
Bulgaria and Estonia, the next highest levels are observed for the southern European 
countries,  and  at  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  the  Scandinavian  countries  have 
relatively low rates of 10-12 per cent. However, the overall extent of cross-national 
                                                 
2 While the target has been set in 2010 for 2020, the lag in availability of data means that the EU-SILC 
data for 2008 and 2018 are apparently to be used as the start and end-points in monitoring success.    9 
variation is relatively modest, and the association between the poverty indicator and 
average national levels of prosperity (such as income per head) is rather weak.  
 
The second column of Table 1 shows the impact on the size of the target population of 
adding the material deprivation element – which entails adding to column (1) those 
who are deprived on 4 or more items on the 9-item material deprivation scale but who 
are not below the 60% income threshold. We see that in the Scandinavian countries, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK this adds no more than 2 per cent 
to  the  target  population,  whereas  at  the  other  extreme  in  Romania,  Bulgaria  and 
Hungary  the  target  population  is  approximately  doubled.  The  combined  rate  for 
relative income poverty or material deprivation ranges from a low of 11 per cent in 
the Netherlands to a high of 42 per cent in Romania. The addition of the deprivation 
criterion thus produces much sharper variation across countries than seen with relative 
income poverty alone, but this mainly involves a much sharper contrast between a 
sub-set of New Member States and the remaining countries rather than a generally 
more graduated pattern of differentiation. This outcome is a consequence of the high 
level of the deprivation threshold and the extremely low levels of deprivation on some 
of the constituent items. In reality, in a number of countries, in order to be located 
above the deprivation threshold, individuals must report enforced deprivation on four 
out of 6 of the items on which non-negligible levels of deprivation are observed. 
 
In column (3) we add those living in households where the level of work intensity is 
less than 0.20 and who have not already been captured by the relative income and 
material deprivation criteria. In general, this produces only modest increases in the 
size  of  the  target  population,  of  less  than  3  percentage  points,  with  the  largest   10 
increases being 7 per cent for the UK and 5 per cent for Hungary, Poland and Ireland. 
The overall variation in the size of the target population is now from 15 per cent in the  
Table 1: Elements of EU Target by Country   
  Below 60% of Median 
Income 
Below 60% of Median or 
Above Deprivation 
Threshold 4+ 
Below 60% of Median or 
Above Deprivation 
Threshold 4+ or Below 
Work Intensity 
Threshold 0.2  
  %  %  % 
Austria  12.4  16.1  18.5 
Belgium  14.7  17.1  20.6 
Bulgaria  21.4  37.5  38.2 
Cyprus  16.3  21.1  22.2 
Czech Republic  9.1  13.1  15.2 
Germany  15.3  17.5  20.3 
Denmark  11.8  13.1  16.4 
Estonia  19.5  21.2  22.0 
Spain  19.6  20.8  23.1 
Finland  13.6  15.4  17.4 
Greece  20.1  25.0  28.1 
Hungary  12.3  24.8  29.5 
Ireland  15.5  18.9  23.7 
Iceland  10.1  10.5  12.1 
Italy  18.7  22.2  25.0 
Lithuania  20.0  28.2  29.6 
Luxembourg   13.4  13.6  15.4 
Latvia  25.6  33.3  33.9 
Netherlands  10.6  11.1  14.8 
Norway  10.6  12.6  15.5 
Poland  11.5  28.1  33.1 
Portugal  16.9  23.8  25.9 
Romania  23.4  42.2  44.3 
Sweden  12.2  13.0  15.4 
Slovenia  11.6  15.7  17.9 
Slovakia  10.9  19.1  20.5 
UK  19.0  21.3  28.3 
EU 27 Countries 
(Weighted) 
15.7  20.6  23.5 
 
Netherlands  to  44  per  cent  in  Romania  –  a  smaller  range  than  in  column  (2). 
Introducing  the  work  intensity  criterion  thus  produces  less  rather  than  more 
differentiation of countries in terms of the overall number at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion. 
 
It is also helpful to look at the impact of adding each criterion on the profile of the 
target  population.  Here  we  focus  on  social  class  composition  measured  using  the   11 
European  Socio-economic  Classification  (ESeC)  (Rose  and  Harrison,  2010).  As 
Goldthorpe (2002:213) observes one of the primary objectives of schemas such as 
ESeC is to bring out the degree of security, stability and prospects associated with 
different  class  positions  and  the  manner  in  which  this  is  reflected  in  long-term 
command  over  resources.  If  poverty  is  understood  as  exclusion  from  customary 
standards  of  living  due  to  lack  of  resources,  one  would  expect  to  observe  an 
unambiguous  relationship  between  social  class  and  poverty  (Whelan  and  Maître, 
2008).  
 
Since country-by-country analysis produces a profusion of figures, we look at this in 
Table 2 for the EU as a whole. This shows first the social class profile of those below 
the 60% relative income threshold. We see that over 50 per cent are drawn from the 
working class,  while a further 26 per cent are in the farming and  petit bourgeois 
classes, with only 10 per cent in the professional and managerial classes. Focusing 
then in column (2) on those added to the target population because they are above the 
deprivation threshold (though not below the income threshold), we see a somewhat 
different pattern. The percentage in the working class is substantially higher at 64 per 
cent, while the farming/petit bourgeoisie now comprise only 12 per cent. Thus the 
hierarchical dimension of class stratification is more important for this group, while 
membership of the classes comprising small property owners is less common. This 
group thus appear, on this evidence, a valuable addition to the target population. By 
contrast, when we focus in column (3) on those added by the work intensity criterion 
we see a social class distribution that contrasts quite sharply with each of the other 
two groups. In this case 27 per cent are drawn from the professional and managerial 
classes, almost three times higher than in either column (1) or (2), while only 43 per   12 
cent are drawn from the working class. This group is substantially less differentiated 
in social class terms than either of the other two: while the adding the deprivation 
criterion  sharpens  the  overall  pattern  of  class  differentiation  in  the  target  group, 
inclusion of the work intensity criterion dilutes it. 
 
Table 2: Social Class Composition of Elements of EU Poverty Target Group (population weighted) 
  Below 60% of Median 
Income 
Above Deprivation 
Threshold 4+ but not 
Below 60% of Median 
Income 
Work Intensity < 0.20 
but Not Above 
Deprivation Threshold 
4+ or Below 60% of 
Median Income  
  %  %  % 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC 
Class 1) Reference 
Category 
4.6  3.8  13.5 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC 
Class 2) 
5.8  7.0  13.9 
Higher Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC classes 
3 & 6) 
12.6  13.2  20.7 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC 
Class 4) 
15.3  5.4  6.1 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  10.5  6.8  2.4 
Lower Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC classes 
7 & 8) 
26.2  33.7  24.0 
Semi & non-skilled 
workers (ESeC class 9) 
26.1  30.1  19.4 
Total  100  100  100 
 
 
As well as looking at the profile of the population groups they identify, the value of 
including each of the EU target indicators (and of taking the overlaps between them 
into  account)  can  also  be  assessed  by  looking  at  how  much  they  help  predict  or 
explain outcomes that one would expect to be associated with poverty and exclusion. 
We  illustrate  this  by  focusing  on  levels  of  self-assessed  economic  stress,  using 
responses  in  EU-SILC  to  construct  a  variable  distinguishing  those  in  households 
reporting „great difficulty‟ or „difficulty‟ in making ends meet as opposed to no such   13 
difficulty. In Table 3 we look at the incremental impact of the three EU target poverty 
and exclusion indicators on this economic stress measure via a stepwise regression 
conducted at the overall EU level. Focusing first on the net odds ratios, we see that the 
net coefficient for material deprivation is 13.1, much greater than the figures of only 
2.5  for  relative  income  poverty  and  1.7  for  low  work  intensity.  Looking  at  the 
explanatory power of the equation in terms of the proportion of variance explained, 
entering the relative income poverty indicator as the first step produces a value of 
0.072  for  the  Nagelkerke  R
2,  a  widely-used  measure  of  explanatory  power.  The 
addition of the material deprivation indicator distinguishing between those with scores 
of 4+ and others increases this measure very substantially, to 0.208. However, adding 
the  low  work  intensity  indicator  then  produces  only  a  modest  further  increase  to 
0.211.  (Allowing  for  all  possible  2-way  and  3-way  interactions  between  relative 
income poverty, material  deprivation  and low work intensity  further increases  the 
Nagelkerke R
2 only marginally, and a similar pattern was observed when each of the 
welfare regimes was analysed separately). Thus both the magnitude of the odds ratios 
and the levels of variance explanation indicate that the material deprivation indicator 
is by far the most important in accounting for levels of self-reported economic stress. 
 
At this point, then, we can put forward two important conclusions about the way the 
EU target population is identified in the 2020 target. The first is that serious questions 
have to be asked about the value of including the household joblessness/low work 
intensity element, not merely in its present form but at all. At a conceptual level, the 
argument for including in the target population persons living in households that are 
jobless but are neither on low income (relative to their own country‟s median income) 
not  materially  deprived  (relative  to  a  common  EU-wide  standard)  is  unclear.   14 
Joblessness  might  be  better  thought  of  as  a  factor  leading  to  income  poverty  or 
material deprivation than as an indicator of poverty. Empirical analysis then shows  
Table 3:  Stepwise Logistic Regression of Economic Stress on Relative Income Poverty, Material 
Deprivation and Low Work Intensity 
  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
       
Income Poverty at 60% Median  3.638  2.648  2.458 
EU Deprivation Index 4 +    13.638  13.149 
Work Intensity <  0.20      1.651 
       
Nagelkerke R
2  0.072  0.208  0.211 
N  536,853     
*All coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level 
 
that the group added to the target population by the inclusion of the joblessness/low 
work intensity criterion has a relatively high proportion from the professional and 
managerial classes and a relatively low proportion from the working class, and that 
being in this group is not associated with high levels of economic stress. The second 
conclusion  is  that,  by  contrast,  the  addition  of  a  material  deprivation  element 
substantially strengthens the target group identification procedure,  with the social 
class profile of those it adds being heavily weighted towards the working class and 
with being above the deprivation threshold being particularly important in accounting 
for  levels  of  self -reported  economic  stress.  Furthermore,  the  addition  of  the 
deprivation criterion produces more variation across countries than seen with relative 
income poverty alone: more of the target group is then located in countries with 
relatively low average income, which many would regard as a move in the right 
direction.  
4. The Implications of the Way Material Deprivation is Measured 
While the inclusion of the material deprivation element improves the identification of 
the target group, this occurs despite the fact that the specific material deprivation 
measure used has several weaknesses. The first relates to the inclusion in the 9-item   15 
index  of  several  items  relating  to  housing  facilities  where  the  numbers  deprived 
approach zero in the more affluent countries and as a consequence cannot contribute 
in a satisfactory fashion to national indices and ensure that certain aspects of cross-
national differences are inevitable consequences of the items  employed. A further 
weakness arises from the fact that a threshold of 4 has been used for the purpose of 
identifying the target population, rather than the threshold of 3 or more used in the 
EU‟s own material deprivation indicator. These features contribute to limiting the 
variability  in  measured  deprivation  within  and  across  countries.  It  is  thus  worth 
exploring whether alternative material deprivation indicator/threshold which seeks to 
avoid such limitations could do an even better job.  
 
We explore this with reference to a 7-item consumption deprivation index that we 
have employed in previous work (see for example Nolan and Whelan, 2010, Whelan 
and Maître, 2007, 2010), also based on data from EU-SILC. This uses 6 of the items 
in the EU 9-item material deprivation scale, plus enforced absence of a PC; it omits 
three items included in the EU 9-item index, namely enforced absence of a phone, a 
washing machine and a colour TV. This index has been shown to have a satisfactory 
level of statistical reliability (for details see Whelan, Nolan and Maître, 2008), with a 
value for Cronbach‟s alpha of 0.74. Our first approach to illustrating the extent to 
which this alternative deprivation measure (with a threshold of 3 or more)  may prove 
to be more appropriate involves adding the consumption deprivation measure to the 
equation  predicting  economic  stress  and  including  the  3  EU  target  indicators  as 
explanatory variables, which was shown in Table 3. This addition would increase the 
Nagelkerke R
2 for the estimated equation from 0.211 to 0.314, while the estimated 
odds ratio for the consumption deprivation variable is close to 8 and that on the EU   16 
deprivation index falls to 2.5. So even when the EU measure of material deprivation is 
already included, adding the consumption deprivation indicator adds considerably to 
the ability to predict economic stress.  
 
This issue is explored further in Table 4 by distinguishing four groups and comparing 
their social class profiles: 
1)  Those  neither  in  the  EU  target  group  nor  above  the  threshold  on  our 
consumption deprivation measure; 
2)  Those identified as being in the target group by the 3 EU indicators but not 
above the threshold on our consumption deprivation measure;  
3)  Those above the threshold on our consumption deprivation index but not in the 
EU target group; 
4)  Those both in the EU target group and above our consumption deprivation 
threshold. 
The size of these groups is noteworthy: while 70 per cent of the EU sample are neither 
in the EU target group nor above our consumption deprivation threshold, only 12 per 
cent are both in the target group and above our deprivation threshold. This leaves two 
substantial groups of particular interest: 11 per cent of the sample who are in the EU 
target group but below our consumption deprivation threshold, and 7 per cent who are 
above our consumption deprivation threshold but are not captured by any of the three 
EU target indicators. This means, strikingly, that about half those in the EU target 
population are not above our consumption deprivation threshold, while two-fifths of 
those above our deprivation threshold are not in the EU target population. 
   17 
Looking at the social class composition of these groups in Table 4, we see that there 
is, as one would expect, a very sharp contrast between those in groups (1) and (4) –  
 
Table 4: Social Class Composition  for Groups Classified by 3 EU Target Indicators  and Consumption 
Deprivation  (population weighted) 





Below 3+  







But Not in EU 
Target Group 





  %  %  %  % 
HRP Social Class         
Higher Salariat (ESeC 
Class 1) Reference 
Category 
18.2  8.5  5.0  2.7 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC 
Class 2) 
18.4  9.0  8.6  5.1 
Higher Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC 
classes 3 & 6) 
20.4  15.9  16.1  11.7 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC 
Class 4) 
8.8  17.0  6.5  7.4 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  2.6  7.5  5.0  10.1 
Lower Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC 
classes 7 & 8) 
17.4  21.9  32.6  31.5 
Semi & non-skilled 
workers (ESeC class 9) 
14.2  20.3  26.3  31.5 
Total  100  100  100  100 
% of EU-27 Population  70.0  11.1  7.0  11.9 
Dissimilarity Index  38.3  24.5  12.3  0.0 
 
that is, between those not in the EU target group or above our deprivation threshold 
compared with those in the target group and above that threshold. Only 32 per cent of 
the former are from the working class versus 63 per cent of the latter, and almost 60 
per cent are from the white collar classes versus 20 per cent. Those in group (2), in the 
EU target  group but below our consumption deprivation threshold, have a rather 
mixed class composition with 41 per cent working class, 33 per cent white collar and 
8 per cent farmers. In contrast group (3), who are above our consumption deprivation 
threshold but not in the EU target group, look very much more like group (4), who are 
both in the EU target group and above our deprivation threshold. These comparisons   18 
can be summarised using an index of dissimilarity, shown in the final row of Table 4, 
calculated for each of the remaining categories. This indicates the proportion of cases 
that would have to be moved to a different class in order to reproduce the composition 
of group (4). Not surprisingly this is very high for group (1), at 40. For those in the 
EU  target  group  but  below  the  consumption  deprivation  threshold  the  contrast  is 
somewhat less sharp but the index of dissimilarity still reaches 25, whereas for those 
above the consumption deprivation threshold but not in the EU target group it is only 
12.  
 
This contrast between these groups is brought  out by looking at how social class 
predicts which group a person falls into. Table 5 shows the results of a multinomial 
regression  which takes  group (1), those not  in  the EU target  group or  above our 
consumption deprivation threshold, as reference category. The estimated odds ratios 
then quantify the impact of social class on the odds on being in each of the three 
remaining groups relative to that benchmark category. A number of features may be 
noted. If we look in the first column at the likelihood of being both in the EU target 
group and above our consumption deprivation threshold rather than in the reference 
category, we see a strong hierarchical class effect: as one moves from the higher 
professional managerial class to the semi and non-skilled manual class, the odds ratio 
rises gradually from 1 to 13 and farmers have a particularly high value of 18. When 
we focus in the second column on those above our consumption deprivation threshold 
but not in the EU target group, we observe a weaker but still marked class hierarchy 
effect, with the odds ratio gradually rising to 6 for the non-skilled class. In the final 
column, we see a much weaker class hierarchy effect for those in the EU target group 
but below our consumption deprivation threshold, peaking at only 3, whereas both of   19 
the propertied classes (petit bourgeois and farmers) are particularly likely to be found 
in this group. 
Table  5: Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on Social 
Class: Entire Sample  
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
Group 
In EU Target 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1,000  1.000  1.000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.764  1.673  1.183 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
3.334  2.612  1.819 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  4.471  2.386  4.293 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  18.522  5.380  7.132 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
9.987  5.669  3.019 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
13.301  6.095  3.305 
       
Nagelkerke
2  0.116 
Reduction in Log Likelihood  4,672 
Degrees of freedom  18 
N  453,598 
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 
These conclusions relate to the sample as a whole. Analysis at welfare regime level 
reveals some interesting variation across regimes.  Countries are grouped into welfare 
regimes, using the categorisation of EU member states into regimes conventionally 
distinguished  in  such  analyses  (see  for  example  Bukodi  and  Róbert,  2007)  and 
treating Bulgaria and Romania as comprising a “residual regime”. 
3Detailed findings 
are set out in the Appendix in Tables A1a to A1g 
 
 Comparing across welfare regimes, in terms of the results relating to the likelihood of 
being both in the EU target group and above our consumption deprivation threshold in 
                                                 
3 Detailed discussion if welfare regime classifications and theoretical expectations relating to variation 
in levels of poverty and social exclusion see Whelan and Maître (2010b).   20 
contrast  with  fulfilling  these  conditions,  the  analysis  reveals  that  in  the  Social 
Democratic, Corporatism and Liberal welfare regimes the increase in this likelihood 
for farmers, though substantial - with odds ratios of 5-8 - is much lower than for most 
of  the  other  regimes.  The  strength  of  the  hierarchical  class  effect  also  varies 
substantially across regimes, with the coefficient for the semi- and non-skilled an 
class rising gradually from 8.4 to 12.9 and finally 22.7 as one moves from the Social 
Democratic to the Liberal regime, with proportionate increases being observed across 
the class spectrum.  The Southern European  regime is  characterised by substantial 
effects for both farming and class hierarchy, with odds ratios of 19 being observed 
both  for  farmers  and  the  semi-skilled  and  non-skilled  class.  The  post-socialist 
corporatist regime looks quite similar to its corporatist counterpart except that the 
farming  coefficient  is  much  larger.  For  the  post-socialist  liberal  regime  the  class 
gradient effect is relatively weak, perhaps reflecting the scale of change in economic 
organisation in these countries. However, the sharpest contrast occurs for the residual 
regime where the anticipated class gradient effect is overshadowed by a much larger 
effect for farming with the odds ratio reaching 40.5.       
 
Focusing on the likelihood of being above our consumption deprivation threshold but 
not in the EU target group, the overall pattern of class differentiation is a good deal 
less pronounced, and variation across welfare regimes is relatively modest in relation 
to  this  category  –  although  there  are  stronger  class  hierarchy  effects  in  Southern 
Europe and stronger farming effects in the remaining regimes. Finally the likelihood 
of being in  the EU target  group but  below our deprivation  threshold is  generally 
relatively  high  for  both  the  petty  bourgeoisie  and  farmers.  Otherwise,  only  rather 
weak hierarchical effects are seen across the various welfare regimes, with the impact   21 
of being in farming emerging as distinctively high in the post-socialist liberal and 
residual welfare regimes. 
 
The key overall finding, which holds across regimes (and indeed countries), is that 
including our consumption deprivation criterion in identifying the group of interest 
leads  to  more pronounced  hierarchical  effects  of social  class on the likelihood of 
being in that group; by contrast, being in the propertied classes is a strong predictor of 
the  likelihood  of  being  in  the  EU  target  group  but  not  meeting  that  deprivation 
criterion. In addition to these general effects we observe variation in class hierarchy 
effects consistent with our understanding of the nature of such regimes and in the 
impact of farming related to the levels and technical sophistication of agricultural 
activity in the countries comprising these regimes. 
 
This could be partly because the threshold used for the EU material deprivation index 
in identifying the target population is 4 or above rather than 3 or above. To shed some 
light on whether simply using the lower threshold on the EU index would achieve as 
much as  switching to  our consumption deprivation index, Table 6  cross-classifies 
persons by whether they are above or below the threshold of 3 on each, and shows the 
class composition of each of the four categories this produces. We see that almost all 
those then counted as deprived on the EU index are also above the same threshold on 
our index. Only 0.3 per cent of the total sample are deprived on the EU index but not 
deprived on our index; the dissimilarity index for this group has a very high value of 
20.6, reflecting the fact that a high proportion (30 per cent) are from the farming class. 
There  remains  however  a  not  insignificant  group,  comprising  1.7  per  cent  of  the 
population, who are deprived on our index but not on the EU one – reflecting the   22 
differences between our 7-item index and the EU‟s 9-item one, as described earlier. 
The dissimilarity index for this group, compared with those both in the target group 
and  above  our  threshold,  is  only  2.5:  they  are  barely  distinguishable  in  class 
composition  terms,  which  suggests  that  the  consumption  deprivation  index  is 
successfully identifying a group appropriate for inclusion in the target population that 
would be missed by the EU deprivation index even with a threshold of 3. 
 
Table 6: Social Class Composition by  EU  Deprivation and Consumption Deprivation Indicator 
(population weighted) 
  Below Threshold 






of 3+ on EU 








Below on EU 
Index 
Above 
Threshold of 3+ 





  %  %  %  % 
HRP Social Class         
Higher Salariat (ESeC 
Class 1) Reference 
Category 
16.9  3.0  2.8  3.6 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC 
Class 2) 
17.1  4.9  5.6  6.5 
Higher Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC 
classes 3 & 6) 
19.9  9.5  12.8  13.4 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC 
Class 4) 
9.9  5.1  7.1  7.0 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  3.2  28.7  8.9  8.1 
Lower Grade white & 
blue collar (ESeC 
classes 7 & 8) 
18.0  27.4  31.6  31.9 
Semi & non-skilled 
workers (ESeC class 9) 
15.0  21.4  31.0  29.4 
Total  100  100  100  100 
% of Relevant 
Population 
80.9  0.3  1.7  17.1 
Index of Dissimilarity   33.3  20.6  2.5  0.0 
 
 
So the conclusion from this analysis of the way material deprivation is measured in 
producing the EU target population is that while the inclusion of this element is a 
valuable advance, the specifics of the deprivation measure by which this is done could   23 
be improved. This relates first to the (unexplained) use of a threshold of 4 or above on 
the material deprivation index: the indicator already included in the social inclusion 
process portfolio uses a threshold of 3 or more, and our analysis suggests this would 
also  be  preferable  in  identifying  the  target  population.  The  second  issue  is  the 
formulation of the index itself: our analysis also suggests that an index constructed 
somewhat differently, using some of the same but also some different indicators (also 
available in EU-SILC), would help improve the identification of the group appropriate 
for  inclusion  in  the  target  population.  This  also  highlights  the  importance  of 
expanding  and  adapting  the  deprivation  items  available  and  employed  for  this 
purpose.   
5. A ‘Consistent Poverty’ Approach? 
As  well  as  the  three  component  elements  of  relative  income  poverty,  material 
deprivation and household joblessness and the way these are framed, the other key 
feature of the way the EU poverty target population has been identified is that it 
includes all those who meet any one of the three criteria – the three criteria are linked 
by “or” rather than “and”.
4 Rather than taking the target group to be those meeting 
any of the three criteria, what would happen if we went to the other extreme and 
focused on those meeting all 3 criteria? Table 7 shows the percentage in each country 
below the 60% income threshold, above the material deprivation threshold, and in a 
low  work  intensity  household,  and  the  results  suggest  that  this  would  not  be  a 
particularly  fruitful  approach.  Where  the  associations  between  dimensions  are 
relatively  modest,  observed  levels  of  multiple  deprivation  will  necessarily  be 
extremely low. The highest number fulfilling all three conditions is 4 per cent (in 
                                                 
4 In the relevant text the phrasing is actually “and/or”, rather curiously, but in effect this has been taken 
to mean “or” in calculating the size of the target population referred to in EU documents.    24 
Bulgaria), while in 23 of the 27 countries the figure is 2 per cent or less and in 9 it is 
less  than  1  per  cent.  A  multiple  deprivation  perspective  involving  all  of  these 
dimensions thus does not appear to have significant value in helping to understand 
cross-national patterns of risk of poverty and social exclusion. If one has decided to 
use  these  three  criteria,  then  focusing  on  the  union  rather  than  the  intersection 
between them seems more helpful. 
 
Table 7: Percentage Meeting Poverty Target Criteria  on All 3 Individual EU Indicators by 
Country   
  % 
Austria  1.4 
Belgium  2.0 
Bulgaria  4.2 
Cyprus  0.8 
Czech Republic  1.4 
Germany  1.6 
Denmark  .3 
Estonia  1.1 
Spain  .5 
Finland  .7 
Greece  1.1 
Hungary  3.1 
Ireland  1.5 
Iceland  .0 
Italy  1.2 
Lithuania  1.5 
Luxembourg   0.2 
Latvia  2.1 
Netherlands  0.5 
Norway  0.5 
Poland  2.0 
Portugal  1.1 
Rumania  2.4 
Sweden  0.3 
Slovenia  1.1 
Slovakia  1.3 
UK  1.4 




It  is  far  from  clear  why  low  work  intensity/joblessness  should  be  included  in 
identifying those “at risk of poverty and social exclusion”, but combining relative 
income  poverty  and  material  deprivation,  and  focusing  on  the  group  where  they   25 
overlap,  is  worth  serious  consideration.  Such  a  measure  has  value  either  as  an 
alternative way of identifying the overall target population in the EU target context or, 
perhaps more realistically now in the light of decisions already made at EU level, as a 
way  of  distinguishing  a  sub-set  within  that  population  which  merits  priority  in 
framing anti-poverty policy. Some countries have combined national low income and 
deprivation indicators to identify the „consistently poor‟, notably Ireland in setting its 
national anti-poverty targets (see for example Noland and Whelan, 1996), and some 
comparative  studies  have  combined  income-based  poverty  measures  with  either 
relative deprivation measures or a common deprivation standard across the EU (see 
for example Forster, 2005, Guio, 2009, Nolan and Whelan, 2010, Whelan and Maître, 
2010a).  Combining the relative income poverty and material  deprivation elements 
used in identifying the EU target population, i.e. being below the 60% relative income 
threshold and above the 4+ threshold on the EU material deprivation index, is one 
possible application of such an approach. A variant also worth exploring combines 
relative income poverty with an alternative common deprivation measure/threshold, 
namely our 7-item consumption deprivation index with a threshold of 3+. It is also 
useful  to  include in  the comparison a purely national  consistent  poverty  measure, 
where  the  deprivation  element  is  framed  in  country-specific  relative  terms  by 
weighting each deprivation item according to the proportion of persons having the 
item in the country and deriving the deprivation threshold so the number above it 
matches the number below the relative income poverty line.  
 
In Table 8 we show the level of consistent poverty in each country for each of these 
three variants. The version incorporating the EU material deprivation measure with a 
4+  threshold  produces  extremely  low  levels  in  the  Scandinavian  countries,   26 
Netherlands  and  Luxembourg,  the  only  countries  above  10  per  cent  are  Latvia, 
Bulgaria and Romania, and the remaining rates are concentrated in the narrow range 
from 1-6 per cent. These results again reflect the choice of deprivation threshold and 
the negligible levels of deprivation on a number of the constituent items in the more 
affluent countries. The variant incorporating the consumption deprivation index with 
a threshold of 3+ measure produces rather higher poverty rates, ranging from 1 per 
cent in  Denmark and Sweden to 20 per cent in Bulgaria and with a significantly 
greater  degree  of  differentiation  across  countries.  Finally,  when  the  deprivation 
component of the consistent poverty measure is framed in national relative terms we 
observe more modest variation across countries, the range now being from 3 per cent 
in Slovakia up to 13 per cent in Latvia. Eighteen countries have rates in the narrow 
range between 3-7  
 
Table 8:Alternative Consistent Poverty Measures by Country, EU-SILC 2008 










Austria  2.7  5.2  5.2 
Belgium  3.3  5.9  6.5 
Bulgaria  15.4  19.8  11.2 
Cyprus  3.4  8.0  8.0 
Czech Republic  2.7  4.9  3.4 
Germany  3.0  6.3  7.1 
Denmark  0.7  1.7  3.7 
Estonia  3.1  7.0  8.8 
Spain  1.4  4.6  9.4 
Finland  1.7  4.0  5.6 
Greece  6.3  10.4  9.4 
Hungary  5.4  8.7  4.4 
Ireland  2.1  4.9  5.3 
Iceland  0.4  1.0  2.6 
Italy  4.0  7.5  7.9 
Lithuania  6.8  11.2  8.7 
Luxembourg   0.5  2.6  6.5 
Latvia  11.3  17.5  13.3 
Netherlands  0.8  2.3  3.9 
Norway  0.8  1.9  4.2 
Poland  6.5  10.4  7.3 
Portugal  4.3  9.3  7.2   27 
Rumania  14.3  18.2  9.8 
Sweden  0.6  1.7  4.2 
Slovenia  2.6  5.4  4.7 
Slovakia  3.6  5.6  3.4 
UK  2.3  5.7  5.2 
 
 
per cent: as one would expect when switching from a common deprivation standard 
across countries to country-specific reference points, consistent poverty levels are 
higher in the more prosperous countries and lower in the least prosperous than in 
column (2). 
 
Table 9 brings out the patterns of variation across countries when they are grouped by 
welfare regime. With the consistent poverty measure incorporating the EU material 
deprivation index and a threshold of 4+, the social democratic regime has very low 
rates, the corporatist, liberal and southern European regimes are also low at 2-3 per 
cent, the post-socialist corporatist and liberal regimes are higher at over 5 and 7 per 
cent respectively, with the residual regime of Bulgaria and Romania much higher at 
15 per cent. The high threshold employed and the specific items in the index  mean 
that  deprivation  rates  are  very  low  rates  outside  the  post -socialist  and  residual 
regimes.  Consistent  poverty  rates  are  higher  when  a  common  consumption 
deprivation index with a threshold of 3 is used instead, with a similar ranking of the 
regimes. Finally, substituting the country-specific relative deprivation measure leads 
to  much  less  variation  between  the  regimes,  although  it  does  still  differentiate 
between them. 
 
Table 9: Consistent Poverty Indicators  by Welfare Regime 




National Relative with 
Consumption 
Deprivation 
  %  %  % 
Social Democratic  0.8  2.3  4.2 
Corporatist  3.0  6.1  6.8   28 
Liberal  2.3  5.6  8.6 
Southern European  3.3  6.9  8.5 
Post Socialist 
Corporatist 
5.4  8.8  5.8 
Post Socialist Liberal  7.5  12.5  10.2 




Since the consistent poverty measure with the EU material deprivation indicator and a 
threshold of 4+ produces such very low rates outside the post -socialist and residual 
regimes,  we restrict our attention to the two other measures in going on to examine 
class differentiation within regimes. Considering the dissimilarity indices in Table 10, 
it is clear that there is  little to choose between them in the extent  to which they 
identify consistently poor groups with class profiles sharply differentiated from  the 
reminder  of  the  population.  This  means  that  the  consistent  poverty  measure 
combining low income with nationally relative deprivation does indeed reflect such 
socio-economic differentiation within countries, but  the  measure incorporating the 
consumption deprivation index across captures both such social class differentiation 
and substantial variation across countries and welfare regimes. 
 
Table 10: Dissimilarity Rates for Social Class Composition  for Consistently Poor v Non-Poor  by 
Types of Measure by Welfare Regime 
  With Common Consumption 
Deprivation, Threshold 3+ 
With National Relative 
Consumption Deprivation 
Social Democratic  24.9  28.3 
Corporatist  38.7  34.6 
Liberal  34.8  37.9 
Southern European  30.6  30.7 
Post Socialist 
Corporatist 
36.4  35.2 
Post Socialist Liberal  29.1  29.9 
Residual  31.7  32.2 
   29 
6. Conclusions  
The target population for the EU‟s central 2020 poverty reduction target is currently 
being identified via combining indicators of low income, deprivation, and household 
joblessness, and this paper has raised a number of important issues in that regard. 
First,  the  inclusion  of  the  household  joblessness/low  work  intensity  criterion  in 
identifying the target population is questionable. Secondly, the way the deprivation 
element of the target is defined could be improved. The EU has provided no explicit 
rationale for the key choices taken in constructing the poverty target. In this paper we 
have argued that, while multidimensional approaches to the measurement of poverty 
seem preferable to a focus solely on income, any such approach must be subject to 
evaluation on both conceptual and empirical grounds. 
 
The  decisions  underlying  the  construction  of  the  EU  poverty  target  have 
consequences for our understanding of the distribution of poverty across countries and 
social  classes  which  raise  important  concerns  relating  to  the  extent  the  current 
proposals  for  setting  EU  poverty  targets  allows  to  successfully  capture  those 
individuals excluded from customary EU living patterns due to lack of resources at 
the national level. 
 
In the final part of this paper we have considered what consistent poverty approaches 
involving a conceptually combination of low income and deprivation can contribute 
to the development of appropriate targets. While looking at those who are either on 
low income or reporting significant deprivation has a value, we have argued that it 
would also be valuable to identify the sub-set of persons and households meeting 
appropriate income and deprivation  criteria: this  could  serve to  identify  a priority   30 




                                                 
5 In Nolan and Whelan (2011) we locate the consistent poverty approach in the 
context of a much broader consideration of the value and limitations of 
multidimensional approaches to the conceptualisation and measurement of poverty 
and social exclusion inthe EU.   31 
References 
Atkinson, A. B., Cantillon, B., Marlier, E., and Nolan, B. (2002) Social Indicators: 
The EU and Social Inclusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Bukodi,  E.  and  Robert,  P.  (2007)  Occupational  Mobility  in  Europe.  European 
Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of  Living  and  Working  Conditions,  Office  for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
European Commission, 2009 
Förster, M. F. (2005) „The European Social Space Revisited: Comparing Poverty in 
the Enlarged European Union‟, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 7: 29-48. . 
Guio,  A.-C.  (2009)  What  can  be  learned  from  deprivation  indicators  in  Europe? 
Eurostat methdologies and working paper, Eurostat, Luxembourg. 
Fusco, A., Guio, A.-C., and Marlier. E. (2010)‟Characterising the income poor and 
the  materially  deprived  in  European  countries‟,  in  Atkinson,  A.B.  and  E.  Marlier 
(eds.) Income and Living Conditions in Europe, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg. 
Layte, R., B. Nolan and C.T. Whelan “Targeting Poverty: Lessons from Ireland‟s 
National Anti Poverty Strategy”, Journal of Social Policy, 29 (4), 553-75, 2000. 
Nolan, B. and Whelan, C T.  (2007),  On the Multidimensionality of Poverty and 
Social Exclusion‟ in Micklewright, J. and Jenkins, S. (Eds.), Poverty and Inequality: 
New Directions , Oxford: Oxford University Press.. 
Nolan, B. and Whelan, C T.  (2010) „Using Non-Monetary Deprivation Indicators to 
Analyse Poverty and Social Exclusion in Rich Countries: Lessons from Europe?‟, 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29: 305-323.  
Nolan, B. and Whelan, C. T. (2011), Poverty and Deprivation in Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University press,   32 
Townsend, P. (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom. Penguin, Harmondsworth.. 
Whelan, C. T., Nolan B. and Maître, B. (2008) Measuring material deprivation in the 
enlarged EU, Working Paper No. 249, The Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Dublin. 
Whelan, C. T. and Maître, B (2010a) „Comparing Poverty Indicators in an Enlarged 
EU‟, European Sociological Review, 26: 713-730.  
Whelan, C. T. and Maître, B (2010b) „Welfare Regime and Social Class Variation in 





Table A1a : Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on 
Social Class, Social Democratic Regime 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
Group 
In EU Target 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1,000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.420  1.556  1.228 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
2.871  2.978  2.073 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  3.957  1.160  3.734 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  1.159  1.227  7.285 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
6.072  4.811  2.285 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
8.385  6.322  2.904 
Nagelkerke
2  0.062     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  2,467.6     
Degrees of freedom  18     
N  57,417     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 










Table A1b: Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on Social 
Class, Corporatist Regime 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
Group 
In EU Target 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1.000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.344  1.736  1.405 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
3.366  3.194  1.821 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  5,084  3.588  4.391 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  2.467  1.597  6.645 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
8,365  5.466  4.566 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
12.940  6.122  5.335 
Nagelkerke
2  0.102     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  3,715.0     
Degrees of freedom  18     
N  45,584     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 
 
Table A1c: Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on Social 
Class, Liberal Regime 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
In EU Target 
Group but Below 
Consumption 
Deprivation 
Threshold   34 
Group 
  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1.000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.969  1.715  1.274 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
6.179  3.159  2.046 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  3.555  1.366  3.235 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  5.850  3.706  2.950 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
16.957  6.291  3.355 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
22.738  4.017  4.490 
Nagelkerke
2  0.132     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  2,728.1     
Degrees of freedom   18     
N  23,756     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 
Table A1d : Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on 
Social Class, Southern European Regime 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
Group 
In EU Target 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1.000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.927  1.768  0.925 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
4.989  3.798  1.651 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  9.933  4.102  4.453 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  19.104  6.879  6.440 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
16.455  9.343  3.094 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
19.250  9.613  3.020 
Nagelkerke
2  0.118     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  8,821.7     
Degrees of freedom  18     
N  91,308     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 
 
Table A1e:  Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on 
Social Class, Post-Socialist Corporatist Regime 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
In EU Target 
Group but Below 
Consumption 
Deprivation 
Threshold   35 
Group 
  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1,000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  2.541  1.471  1.201 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
4.527    1.454 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  2.214  2.845  2.768 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  12.337  1.809  5.672 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
11.331  3.266  2.311 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
15.573  5.135  2.311 
Nagelkerke
2  0.121  5.489  2.295 
Reduction in Log Likelihood  9,817.0     
Degrees of freedom  22     
N  24,599     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 
 
Table A1f: Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on Social 
Class, Post-Socialist Liberal 
  In EU Target 







Threshold but Not 
In EU Target 
Group 
In EU Target 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1,000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  1.337  1.940  0.838 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
2.307  1.966  1.564 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  2.583  1.293  5.723 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  7.469  3.793  13.552 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
6.674  3.420  2.597 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
8.188  3.989  3.092 
Nagelkerke
2  0.109     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  2,701.1     
Degrees of freedom  22     
N  27,906     




Table A1g: Multinomial Regression of EU Indicator and Consumption Deprivation Typology on Social 
Class, Residual Regime 
  In EU Target 





In EU Target 
Group but Below 
Consumption   36 
Deprivation 
Threshold 
Threshold but Not 




  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
HRP Social Class       
Higher Salariat (ESeC Class 1) 
Reference Category 
1.000  1.000  1,000 
Lower  Salariat (ESeC Class 2)  2.181  2.673  3.506 
Higher Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 3 & 6) 
2.909  2.300  2.205 
Petit Bourgeoisie (ESeC Class 4)  6.771  2.241  7.616 
Farmers (ESeC Class 5)  40.510  7.117  34.144 
Lower Grade white & blue collar 
(ESeC classes 7 & 8) 
8.442  4.948  4.758 
Semi & non-skilled workers (ESeC 
class 9) 
10.721  4.163  3.846 
Nagelkerke
2  0.167     
Reduction in Log Likelihood  3,516.4     
Degrees of freedom  22     
N  21,561     
Note: Reference group neither in EU Target Group nor above Consumption Deprivation Threshold 